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Liberal Internationalism - Historical Trajectory and Current Prospects  
Beate Jahn 
 
Abstract 
Liberal internationalism has been in crisis for a while now. Yet, until recently its 
supporters have argued that its prospects are better than ever since the successful 
spread of liberal principles, practices and institutions in the international sphere 
provides the necessary basis for reform. Alas, recent political developments do not 
support these expectations. In fact, the Brexit vote, the Trump election, and the rise of 
populism more generally challenge liberalism in the domestic sphere and aim to 
unravel its international achievements. But the idea that these movements are 
therefore liberalism's nemesis does not quite follow. Providing a theoretical and 
historical analysis of liberalism, this article shows that the separation of domestic and 
international politics is constitutive of liberalism itself. The successful extension of 
liberal principles into the international sphere undermines this separation and thus 
liberalism itself. Ironically, therefore, the prospects of liberal internationalism are 
dependent on the reestablishment of a clear divide between domestic and international 
politics. And this, I argue, is precisely the goal of contemporary populist movements.  
 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
The end of the Cold War was widely seen as ushering in a liberal world order. Liberal 
states seemed to have triumphed over communism, liberal theories appeared 
vindicated while realism found itself in trouble, and liberal internationalist policies 
were expected to quickly realize liberal principles in all those parts of the world that 
had not yet fully embraced them. 
 
It did not take long, though, for these expectations to be frustrated. Already in the 
course of the 1990s, many of the policies designed to realize this vision - from 
democracy promotion through humanitarian intervention to neoliberal economic 
policies - failed to achieve their aims. Under the Bush administration in the early 
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2000s, the United States (US) seemed to abandon liberal internationalism altogether. 
It replaced mulitlateralism with unilateralism, shunned its friends and allies, ignored 
international institutions, pursued an aggressive and illegal foreign policy, and 
prominently violated human rights.1 In addition, neoliberal economic policies led in 
2008 to a global financial crisis. Liberal internationalism, as observers widely agreed, 
was in crisis and some even argued that the liberal international 'experiment has 
failed'.2  
 
The death of liberal internationalism, proponents argued however, had been greatly 
exaggerated. Though they concurred that liberal internationalism was in crisis, their 
analysis suggested that this was a crisis of success. The success of liberal 
internationalist policies had fed the hubris of the US as the leading power and 
architect of the liberal world order since 1945. Insensitive to the positions and 
interests of other states, it acted like a bully and thus generated resistance. Thus, 
Ikenberry argues, it is not liberal internationalism that is in crisis but rather America's 
authority as the hegemonic leader of the liberal world order; it is a crisis of 'American 
authority'. 3   
 
According to this analysis, the successful spread of liberal principles in the 
international sphere provided excellent conditions for a revival of liberal 
internationalism.4 In the absence of serious external enemies, the US was free to 
embark on internal reform, to address this crisis of 'American authority'. A liberal 
international environment, in other words, was seen as a precondition for, and 
conducive to, the realization of liberal principles per se. And these principles in turn 
would provide the basis for a reformed 'democratic internationalism' without the 
counterproductive features of American hubris and exceptionalism.5  
 
And yet, recent political developments run counter to these expectations. The Brexit 
vote, the Trump election and the rise of populism in core liberal states more generally 
constitute an attack on, rather than the reform of, core liberal principles. What is 
more, instead of capitalizing on the successes of liberal internationalism, these 
movements explicitly set out to demolish its core principles and achievements. These 
developments suggest that liberalism's international success, far from providing the 
basis for domestic reform, plays a role in undermining its domestic constituency.  
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Assessing the prospects of liberal internationalism thus requires an analysis of its role 
in and for liberalism in general. I will begin by showing that the relationship between 
the domestic and international spheres plays a crucial - albeit radically different - role 
in liberal internationalism and in contemporary populism. In order to evaluate these 
two contradictory accounts, the second part of this article explores the relationship 
between the domestic and the international in liberal theory - and shows that their 
separation is a precondition for, and constitutive of, liberalism. The third section 
provides a brief historical sketch of the establishment and development of liberalism. 
It demonstrates that the divide between the domestic and international spheres 
allowed liberalism to manage its internal contradictions. Overcoming that divide 
through the successful constitution of a globalized liberal world order undermines this 
function and thus endangers the political, economic and ideological basis of 
liberalism as such. 
 
This analysis suggests, I will conclude, that the successful spread of liberal principles 
abroad paradoxically undermines liberalism at home. While the advocates of liberal 
internationalism are correct, therefore, to identify the current crisis as one of success, 
they mistakenly reduce this crisis to one of American leadership and misjudge its 
implications. Rather, the prospects of liberalism - and by extension of liberal or a 
reformed democratic internationalism - are dependent on the emergence of serious 
external and/or internal threats, on the reerection of a clear domestic/international 
divide. And this, I argue, is paradoxically the goal of the Brexiteers, the Trumpists, 
and contemporary populist movements more generally.  
 
The crisis of liberal internationalism 
Liberal internationalism is today widely associated with the foreign policies of the US 
- particularly since WW II but often also traced back to Woodrow Wilson. Liberal 
internationalism and American foreign policy are, of course, not identical. American 
governments, such as the Bush or Trump administrations, do not always pursue 
liberal internationalist foreign policies; and the foreign policies of other, for example 
European, states may also fit into this framework. There is nevertheless significant 
overlap between the current debate on the crisis of liberal internationalism and 
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American foreign policy - largely because the US has indeed been the leading liberal 
power in world politics during the 20th century.6  
 
In order to sketch the crisis of liberal internationalism, it is necessary to first outline 
its achievements. Thus, from 1945 to 1989 the US managed to establish a liberal 
order in the Western part of the world, a liberal international subsystem.7 This liberal 
subsystem had five distinguishing features: co-binding security arrangements, 
penetrated reciprocal hegemony, the integration of semi-sovereign and partial great 
powers, economic openness, and civic identity.8 Against this background, the end of 
the Cold War opened up the possibility to extend these features to the international 
order at large, to realize a liberal world order 'marked by openness, sovereign 
equality, respect for human rights, democratic accountability, widely shared economic 
opportunity, and the muting of great power rivalry, as well as collective efforts to 
keep the peace, promote the rule of law, and sustain an array of international 
institutions tailored to solving and managing ... common global problems'.9 
 
This vision, however, did not come to pass despite considerable efforts during the 
1990s. While capitalism and neoliberal economic policies were successfully rolled out 
to societies in Eastern Europe and the Third World that had previously followed the 
Soviet model, they did not generate general prosperity but economically very painful 
transitions and rising inequality. Concerted efforts to promote democracy - through 
assistance, sanctions, and military interventions - led in most target societies to some 
form of 'illiberal' or 'authoritarian democracy'.10 Humanitarian interventions were 
selectively undertaken, quickly abandoned in the face of (human or financial) costs, 
and often destabilized polities and even triggered civil war.11 
 
Many of these failures, liberal internationalists argued, had their roots in American 
exceptionalism and hubris. Being 'born liberal' with little experience of violent class 
struggle, the US overlooked that capitalism generates 'maldistribution of wealth, 
income, and opportunity' and thus requires social democratic forms of redistribution. 
Instead, it imposed the 'fundamentalist capitalism' of the Reagan-Thatcher era with 
the result of increasing inequality - policies that split populations, undermined support 
for free trade, and highlighted the fact that the US does not accept responsibility to 
help the 'bottom billion'.12  
 5 
 
The unique historical experience of the US also blinded it to the fact that the 
introduction of democracy in states characterized by different social and political 
conditions - both in Europe and in postcolonial states - had led to the development of 
different models of democracy. Yet, its leading role allowed the US to overlook that 
these models of democracy were, on many measures, more successful than the 
American one which it exported indiscriminately.13  
 
The extraordinary power of the US in a unipolar liberal world order also facilitated 
insensitivity towards the interests and identities of other states, entailed frequent 
interventions in their internal affairs, led to power politics and even to aggressive war 
in Iraq. Despite its military might, moreover, the rise of terrorism indicated that US 
foreign policies failed to provide security.14 Thus, American authority declined on 
account of its high-handed policies - its willingness to reject treaties (Kyoto Protocol, 
ICC, ABM), its violation of international law (Guantanamo Bay), the rejection of help 
from NATO in the war against the Taliban, the war against Iraq without UN 
authorization - and led to resistance even amongst friends and allies.15  
 
According to this account, the crisis of liberal internationalism is a crisis of success. 
Liberal internationalist policies were so successful in empowering the US that it was 
able to disregard the interests and achievements of other states, to ignore its own 
shortcomings, to apply international law and military power selectively, and to 
undermine commitment to free trade as well as paving the way for the development of 
competing democratic powers like the BRICS. 16  
 
Yet this success, liberal internationalists argued, also provided the resources for 
reform - for a new grand strategy of democratic internationalism. The 'realization of 
the worldwide triumph of the liberal vision is within reach' because now 'the obstacles 
are located primarily within the democratic world'.17 In other words, liberal 
internationalism, despite its shortcomings, successfully removed any major external 
threat or competitor and this paves the way for the necessary internal reforms. In 
order to realize these reforms, the US has to recognize that the times of 
exceptionalism and unchallenged leadership are over. Democratic internationalism 
entails the recognition that liberal internationalism has its 'roots in social democratic 
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ideals' that compensate the inevitable losers of a capitalist economy and cushion its 
divisive tendencies.18 It also requires a move towards more collaboration and burden 
sharing with other democracies and the readiness to pay attention to, and learn from, 
their experiences in order to revitalize democracy and citizen participation at home.19 
And it has to develop foreign policy tools that work more by way of example and 
'pull' rather than imposition and 'push'.20 In short, the liberalization of the international 
sphere was seen as the precondition for a revival of liberalism at home and, in turn, 
democratic internationalism abroad - both as a result of the removal of external 
threats. 
 
Alas, the Brexit vote, the Trump election, and the rise of populist movements more 
generally challenge this analysis in two core respects. First, they run counter to the 
claim that the current crisis is not one of liberal principles but of American authority. 
Current populist movements undermine core liberal principles in the domestic sphere. 
Though they generate more citizen participation, they do so through rallies and 
referenda rather than liberal democracy. They also challenge the rule of law by 
attacking judges or willfully subjecting them to political interests. They make 
nationalism, racism, misogynism and the attack on other minorities respectable 
again.21 Moreover, these policies cannot be attributed to a crisis of American 
authority alone. While American high-handedness may indeed have played a role in 
the current crisis, the distribution of these populist movements suggests a deeper 
problem. Much of the British population is unhappy with European, not American, 
policies. Germany has a populist movement despite the fact that it practices more 
social democratic policies of redistribution than the US and weathered the latest 
economic crisis rather well. Not only Donald Trump but also Marine le Pen is flirting 
with Russia and other authoritarian states. Populist practices, rather than liberal 
democracy, are spreading in countries with very different democratic traditions. 
 
Second, rather than building on the achievements of liberal internationalism, populist 
movements systematically target and aim to dismantle these achievements. They 
attack multilateralism and put 'America (or Britain, or France) first'; they prioritize 
national over international law, citizenship over human rights; they cooperate with 
authoritarian regimes; they drop free trade agreements, exit free trade blocs and 
pursue protectionist policies; they attempt to block migration and travel and thus build 
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walls rather than bridges between states. Today's populist movements, in short, rebel 
against the globalized liberal world order - and thus liberal internationalism's greatest 
achievement.22 
 
We are thus confronted with two radically different takes on the current crisis and its 
solutions. While liberal internationalists trace its roots to arrogant American foreign 
policies and view a reformed democratic internationalism as the solution, populists 
identify liberal elites as the problem and aim to solve it by discarding liberal 
principles. Despite these fundamental differences, however, the relationship between 
the domestic and international spheres plays a crucial role in both narratives. In both 
cases, the nature of the international order determines the possibilities of domestic 
development. An assessment of the prospects of liberal internationalism thus has to 
come to grips with the relationship between domestic and international politics in and 
for liberalism. 
 
The international in liberal theory 
Liberalism is generally taken to denote a particular form of government characterized 
by individual rights, the rule of law, private property and the political participation of 
the population - it is a form of domestic politics. These domestic liberal principles 
may then be extended into the international sphere. Yet, both liberal internationalists 
as well as contemporary populist movements turn this sequence onto its head when 
they treat a liberal international sphere either as a precondition for the reform and 
further development of domestic liberalism or as a crucial barrier to domestic 
(national) development. Turning to the work of John Locke, I will show that the 
separation of, and dynamic relationship between, the domestic and the international 
sphere is, in fact, a constitutive element of liberalism.  
 
Liberalism is a complex cultural phenomenon, 'a complex of elements associated in 
historical reality which we unite into a conceptual whole from the standpoint of their 
cultural significance'.23 Though liberalism, therefore, does not have a founder, and its 
individual elements have their own histories, Locke is widely regarded as (one of) the 
first who put its different elements together into a coherent whole that subsequently 
inspired a powerful political movement.24 The work of Locke thus provides an 
entrypoint into the study of liberalism. Moreover, Locke wrote before the existence of 
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liberal polities and thus explicitly formulates the policies necessary to establish 
liberalism - including, I will show, the crucial role of the international.  
 
In response to the general crisis of the 17th century that had undermined the political, 
religious, intellectual and economic order in Europe in general and England in 
particular, Locke set out to develop a new conception of politics. He began by 
positing a self-evident principle, namely that the state of nature of all men is ‘a State 
of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and 
Persons as they think fit’.25 Yet, in order to uphold this freedom human beings needed 
to preserve themselves.26 This requirement could be fulfilled, Locke argued, if ‘every 
Man has a Property in his own Person'  and 'the Labour of his Body and the Work of 
his Hands’.27 Self-possession, property in one's person and the fruit of one's labor, 
thus allows individuals 'the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of 
the state Nature leaves it in, which begins the Property'.28 According to Locke, this 
natural right to private property underpins and upholds not just the life of the 
individual who would otherwise perish;29 it also makes the individual independent of 
others for its survival and thus establishes its freedom. This natural freedom of the 
individual then militates against absolute government. ‘Men are naturally free, and the 
Examples of History shewing, that the Governments of the World… had their 
beginning laid on that foundation, and were made by the Consent of the people’.30 
And since this freedom is based on property, the ‘great and chief end therefore (of 
government) is the Preservation of their Property’.31  
 
According to Locke's theory, then, the three core principles of liberal thought are 
private property, individual freedom, and government by consent. These principles 
still lie at the core of most conceptions of liberalism. Today they are embodied in 
market economy, human rights, and democracy. Crucially, however, in Locke's 
theory these principles are mutually constitutive: Private property constitutes 
individual freedom and individual freedom requires government by consent whose 
main task in turn is the protection of private property which completes the circle by 
upholding individual freedom.  
 
This theoretical core indeed suggests that liberalism is first and foremost concerned 
with domestic politics. And yet, it turned out that this vision of domestic politics 
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could not be realized in practice because it did not reflect the social and political 
conditions in Locke's time. Most people simply had no private property and most 
governments were not based on consent. Instead of an analysis of reality, therefore, 
this was a normative theory - offering a political model to be realized. To this end, 
Locke had to develop a political strategy for the realization of liberalism in a 
nonliberal environment. And in this strategy, the international sphere played a crucial 
role.  
 
If private property was the basis of individual freedom, Locke argued, property 
owners would demand that government protect private property and hence their 
freedom. He thus advocated the extension of full political rights to property owners - 
and their denial to those who did not own property. ‘Paternal Power is … where 
Minority makes the Child incapable to manage his property; Political where Men 
have Property in their own disposal; and Despotical over such as have no property at 
all’.32  
 
Yet limiting political rights to property owners contradicted his claim that, in 
principle, all people were born free and equal and thus had a right to consent to 
government. Hence, Locke was interested in extending the franchise and he argued 
that this could be achieved by providing private property, ideally, to all members of 
society who would thus be constituted as free individuals in the liberal sense and in 
turn support liberal political and economic institutions. This solution, however, raised 
the question where all this additional property was to come from. Private property 
was, after all, protected and could therefore not be redistributed. So, Locke argued 
that because private property was more productive than common property and thus of 
greater benefit to all of humankind,33 common property could be turned into private 
property: God gave the land ‘to the use of the Industrious and Rational’.34 People 
could simply attain property by mixing their individual labor with the original 
common property. The privatization of common property was thus the solution to the 
problem. 
 
Yet, land - at the time the most important additional source of wealth - in England 
was too scarce to provide the vast and rising number of poor with property. Hence 
Locke looked abroad: 'Yet there are still great Tracts of Ground to be found, which 
 10 
(...), lie waste, and are more than the People who dwell on it, do, or can make use of, 
and so still lie in common'.35 It was this common land in America which could be 
used, at least in principle, to furnish all individuals with property and thus make them 
eligible to full political rights. The establishment of liberalism thus required policies 
of colonialism which Locke's writings - political and theoretical - consistently 
advocate and defend.36 
 
The solution to Locke's conundrum - that the constitution of liberalism required the 
spread of private property even while private property could not be redistributed 
because it had to be protected as the basis of individual freedom - thus lay in the 
international sphere. It lay in the possibility to appropriate other peoples' property and 
this in turn required power politics. In other words, the constitution of domestic 
liberalism required a sharp distinction between two different political spheres: the 
domestic sphere governed by the rule of law and liberal principles and the 
international sphere characterized by power politics.  
 
According to this Lockean theory, in sum, the core principles of liberalism are 
individual freedom, private property, and government by consent. And the core 
policies necessary to establish a society based on these principles are, first, the 
privatization of common property - and hence the expropriation of communities 
whose livelihood depends on that common property. And since the latter cannot be 
supposed to have any interest in their own expropriation, the establishment of 
liberalism, second, requires the extension of political rights to property owners only - 
and their denial to those who do not own property.  
 
These policies of appropriation and expropriation, emancipation and oppression, 
however, clearly lead to tensions within society - between those who benefit from 
privatization and those who lose, between those who gain political rights and those 
who don't. These tensions and the lack of sufficient common land for privatization in 
the domestic sphere put limits on the pursuit of liberal policies. The solution to this 
problem lay in the international sphere - where land held in common was plentiful 
and its appropriation/colonization did not exacerbate the tensions within domestic 
society but helped relieve them. In theory, therefore, the relationship between the 
domestic and the international functions like a safety valve that allows the import of 
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economic benefits from the international sphere and the export of political tensions 
from the domestic sphere. The question for the next section therefore is whether and 
how this theoretical logic played itself out historically.  
 
The international in liberal history 
This section provides a, necessarily brief, historical account of the establishment and 
development of liberalism - with particular attention to the relationship between the 
domestic and the international. It shows that the policies outlined in Locke's theory 
do, indeed, lie at the core of liberalism. The historical development of liberalism 
confirms the liberal internationalists' injunction that the current crisis is a crisis of 
success. But it also shows that this paradoxical dynamic is a constitutive part of 
liberalism and not just a problem of American authority.  
 
Protoliberal developments followed the crisis of the 17th century that had loosened 
many of the rigid rules of society. While the lower classes were widely interested in 
keeping and institutionalizing these freedoms,37 men like Locke's own employer, the 
Earl of Shaftesbury, who had made fortunes (often through overseas trade) demanded 
political rights with direct reference to their property - which led to a huge increase of 
members in the House of Commons.38 Their political representation resulted in the 
establishment of a liberal state characterized by the transference of de jure political 
power into the hands of commercial and capitalistic interests and the stabilization of 
property rights in 17th century Britain.39 Hence, just as Locke had argued, private 
property constituted individual freedom which in turn provided the basis for 
government by consent.  
 
Once in power this ruling elite systematically pursued the privatization of common 
property and justified it with reference to its productivity. Locke's work was 
frequently cited in Parliament in support of private enclosure acts which, between 
1710 and 1815, transferred 20% of the total land from common into private 
property.40 This large-scale privatization of common land led, within the domestic 
sphere, to the impoverishment of wide sections of society and thus to upheavals, 
rebellions and the threat of revolution. 41 These protoliberal policies hence did not just 
constitute free liberal individuals - they simultaneously constituted nonliberal forces 
who could not be expected to uphold private property rights and therefore had to be 
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denied political rights.42 In short, the realization of liberal principles produced an 
economically and politically deeply divided society. 
 
These tensions were right from the start relieved, to some extent, through colonialism. 
Locke's justification of colonialism was widely used by 'preachers, legal theorists, and 
politicians' to base first the land claims of the British colonists and then those of the 
American citizens on the enclosure and cultivation of indigenous land.43 The same 
argument was also influential in Australia, New Zealand, Canada well into the 19th 
century.44 Colonialism allowed the European elites to appropriate 'foreign' land - thus 
easing the economic burden on the domestic poor. It also provided an opportunity for 
the poor to emigrate; and it allowed the government to export its poor, its criminals, 
its orphans as well as to offer employment for the middle and higher classes in the 
administration of the colonies - and thus eased political pressure on domestic 
government.45 Most importantly for the subsequent political development of settler 
states like the US, however, colonialism provided common political ground - namely 
the interest in expropriating foreign land and hence a commitment to the principle of 
private property which justified this expropriation - for rich and poor alike and thus 
bridged the gap between their otherwise mutually exclusive interests.  
 
Yet, while these colonial enterprises served to relieve some of the tensions in the 
domestic sphere, they added pressures in their own right. Competition between 
empires during the 18th century - often generated by local interests and private 
pressures - led to extremely expensive wars that were fought out all over the globe. 
And it was the attempt to pay for these wars by increasing taxes that exacerbated the 
already existing tensions between rich and poor in domestic society and played a 
major role in triggering the revolutions of the end of the 18th century. In France the 
Revolution forced the ruling elites to widen the franchise.46 In the American colonies, 
the settlers often had private property but did not enjoy the same political rights (such 
as consenting to taxes) as their peers in the mother country. Hence they fought for 
political independence - the right to sovereignty.47 At the turn of the 19th century, in 
short, the domestic and international tensions created by liberal policies came home to 
roost - in the form of domestic revolutions and the fragmentation of empires, not only 
in the British colonies in North America but also in much of Latin America.48 
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This age of revolution gave rise to new forms of thinking about politics49 that found 
expression in the 'rights of man'50 - the right to life, liberty and property or the pursuit 
of happiness - and provided the foundation for the formulation of human rights that 
today play such a crucial role in liberal thought and practice. Both in America and 
France these rights were codified in the new constitutions and provided the basis for 
individual liberty in the form of rights to political participation in the domestic sphere 
as well as for 'national' liberty or the right to 'sovereignty' in the international sphere. 
Though universal in their formulation and aspiration, these rights were quite 
particular in their application. While the French Revolution led to an extension of the 
franchise, women, the non-propertied sections of society, the colonial population in St 
Domingue and European populations that came under French rule in the course of the 
Napoleonic wars were excluded from equal political rights. It also led to the crowning 
of Napoleon as emperor and the pursuit of empire building both within, and less 
successfully, outside Europe.51 Independent Brazil, too, set itself up as an empire and 
excluded vast sections of the population from political rights.52 Threatened by the 
military and ideological challenge of the French Revolution and fearful of social 
upheaval, Britain entered a new phase of imperial expansion.53 And American 
independence led to an 'empire of liberty' that included slavery and rightless 
indigenous populations as well as the pursuit of westward expansion.54 Moreover, 
when westward expansion was completed towards the end of the 19th century, the 
USA joined other imperial powers - at the time engaged in the scramble for Africa - 
in the construction of its own overseas empire.55 These policies were largely 
motivated by and 'operated as a massive scheme of economic redistribution ... that 
lined the pockets of a privileged class of traders and investors'.56 There was, then, 
nothing exceptional about American foreign policy. 
 
The 19th century, in sum, was characterized by the contradictory political principles 
of political freedom and its denial, of sovereignty and imperialism. 57 Empire-building 
was a liberal enterprise systematically supported by liberal international lawyers58 and 
political thinkers alike.59 Indeed, the principle of layered sovereignty so characteristic 
of empire was confirmed by the Berlin Conference as late as the end of the 19th 
century.60 And the idea of an international order based on nation states was only 
codified in 1948 in the UN Charter, and largely realized in the 1970s after 
decolonization.61 
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In the course of the 19th century, however, liberal elites were forced into a variety of 
political and economic compromises. In Europe, the industrial revolution led to 
heightened exploitation of workers as well as the wide spread constitution of workers' 
movements.62 But it also generated economic growth and the development of a 
sizable middle class.63 The combined political pressure from workers' movements and 
'liberal' middle classes led to widespread if short-lived revolutions in the middle of the 
19th century and forced the ruling elites to make a number of concessions. These 
included the lowering of the property threshold for voting rights and thus a gradual 
extension of political rights to the middle class. Workers, meanwhile, were provided 
with economic concessions in the form of welfare legislation (Germany) or factory 
regulation (Britain). These social democratic forms of redistribution thus do not 
constitute 'roots' of liberalism; 64 they are, rather, the result of considerable political 
pressure.  
 
And it is the absence of this pressure that explains the divergent development in 
settler states like America. The necessary manpower to conquer and settle such 
territory was provided through large scale immigration and motivated by promises of 
land ownership. Consequently, settler societies were characterized by a relatively 
wide distribution of property, by alternatives to industrial work, and by the common 
political interest in the expropriation of the indigenous population and thus a 
commitment to the protection of private property underpinning these policies. Hence, 
the political pressure to introduce social democratic forms of redistribution was 
largely missing in settler states.65  
 
Despite these political and economic compromises, however, by the end of the 19th 
century liberal states had managed to create the first liberal world order: consisting of 
a highly integrated world economy based on liberal interests and the extension of 
formal or informal rule of liberal states to virtually all parts of the globe and enforced 
by the most powerful liberal state of the time - Britain. Yet it was precisely this 
success that quickly turned into a major crisis and the fragmentation of this liberal 
world order. With no space left for external expansion - for the import of economic 
benefits and the export of political problems - the tensions and contradictions of 
liberalism played themselves out within that liberal world order. They produced three 
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major fault lines. First, they intensified competition between liberal states for colonies 
which played an important role in the runup to World War I (WW I). Second, the 
contradictions between political freedom for some populations and the political 
oppression of others were now embodied within liberal empires and led to 
independence movements in the colonies. Third, the war and its aftermath led to 
heightened protectionism, a major economic crisis and rising economic inequality. 
The liberal economic dynamic of appropriation through expropriation thus played 
itself out in the domestic sphere where it fed fascism and communism - antiliberal 
forces on the right and on the left - and led to revolution in Russia as well as the 
introduction of universal suffrage in most European states. The first liberal world 
order, in short, succumbed to the internal contradictions of liberalism in the course of 
World War II (WW II) - giving way to a bipolar system and the Cold War. 
 
This comprehensive crisis, however, catapulted the US into the leading role. WW I 
severely weakened European powers and it generated serious anxiety about the future 
of race relations, particularly in the US.66 Woodrow Wilson, often seen as the author 
of American liberal internationalism, combined the latter with a systematic 'liberal 
imperialism' in theory and practice.67 Again, however, it was the fear of external 
threats, the spectre of the Soviet Union and the rise of communism and fascism in 
Europe, and internal revolution, the global economic crisis and increasing poverty, 
that finally led to the implementation of the New Deal and hence the adoption of 
social democratic forms of redistribution also in America.68  
 
On the basis of this experience, the US began to develop and implement what we now 
call liberal internationalism after WW II. These policies were driven by US interest in 
the consolidation and spread of capitalism in general and stable markets in Europe in 
particular. This required the containment of the Soviet Union and the communist 
alternative it offered - both to newly independent states in the Third World and to 
dissatisfied populations in core liberal states.69 These dangers created bipartisan 
support for economic aid in the form of the Marshall Plan for Europe, for the 
institutionalization of liberal economic principles through the Bretton Woods 
institutions, for the United Nations as a means to check aggression, for development 
aid integrating newly independent states into the liberal capitalist camp, and for the 
promotion of democracy and human rights.70 The 'embedded liberalism' of the post-
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War period ensured and expanded free trade while providing individual states with 
the opportunity to develop a welfare state and to regulate employment.71 This post-
WW II liberal internationalism thus consisted in extending liberal principles, practices 
and institutions into the international sphere as a means to consolidate, strengthen and 
expand the liberal camp.  
 
Yet, this extension of liberal principles was again accompanied by political 
oppression and expropriation. While the US promoted democracy in principle, it 
equally systematically suppressed the political rights of populations with (supposedly) 
nonliberal leanings through interventions and propped up dictators that implemented 
and guaranteed liberal economic principles and/or provided support for the 'liberal' 
side in the Cold War. 72 Redistributive economic policies were abandoned in response 
to the economic downturn of the 1970s, and replaced with a remarkable revival of 
laissez-faire liberalism in the form of market economics, the privatization of state-
owned industries, and the trimming of welfare benefits by liberal democracies.73 Such 
neoliberal economic policies were also extended into the international sphere. 
Liberalization, deregulation and privatization - that is, the expropriation of common 
property and the removal of protections for vulnerable populations - provided the core 
of the 'Washington consensus' imposed by financial institutions like the IMF, the 
World Bank and the US Treasury on developing countries. The results of these 
policies were often disastrous - increasing poverty and inequality feeding political 
unrest.74  
 
But it was the emergence of a second liberal world order after the end of the Cold 
War that undermined the domestic/international divide which allows liberalism to 
manage these tensions - and thus undermined liberalism itself, above all in core 
liberal states. The end of the Soviet Union and with it the absence of a serious 
external (political, economic, ideological) threat eroded the bipartisan consensus in 
liberal polities and led to the fragmentation of the political landscape with extreme 
parties on the right and on the left gaining power.75 With liberal capitalism the only 
game in town, the need for political or economic compromise in the domestic sphere 
was gone. The much despised 'cosmopolitan establishment'76 could now pursue its 
economic interests unimpeded across the globe. Welfare states were further 
dismantled, followed by austerity policies after the financial crisis of 2008, and 
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economic inequality took on obscene dimensions. Instead of protecting domestic 
populations in core liberal states from the inevitable downside of capitalism by 
importing and redistributing economic benefits from the international sphere, these 
populations now experienced the exact opposite: the export of investment and jobs 
into the international sphere.  
 
Economic globalization and the rise of inequality as well as civil wars and military 
interventions that often exacerbated these conflicts77 increased refugee flows and 
migration. Thus, instead of being able to export political conflicts, populations in core 
liberal states saw themselves confronted with the import of political tensions in the 
form of refugees and migrants. And the 'globalization' of human rights law and 
policies challenged the hitherto privileged citizenship rights and identities of majority 
populations in core liberal states. The erosion of the domestic/international divide 
thus undermined the economic, political and ideological basis of domestic liberalism 
and generated resistance: the anti-globalization movement, the occupy movement, 
populist movements and parties.  
 
The establishment of a liberal world order also undermined the crucial distinction 
between a liberal and a nonliberal camp that had informed, and was used to justify, 
liberal foreign policies. In the absence of a serious nonliberal camp, policies of liberal 
cooperation and integration fell apart. The Iraq war was not backed by a liberal 
alliance, such as NATO, but by a 'coalition of the willing' - states motivated by a 
variety of interests (ranging from aid to American support in other matters). 
Multilateralism lost support in many liberal states. Humanitarian intervention and 
democracy promotion were selectively undertaken and openly justified with reference 
to the interests of powerful states78, undermining liberal principles like the 
commitment to stop genocide79 - and generating resistance within target 
populations.80 The selective adherence to human rights (Guantanamo Bay) and 
international law in general (Iraq) and accusations of bias (ICC) undermine the 
standing of international law. In the absence of an alternative to capitalism, 
protectionism and hence competition between liberal states is on the rise. Increasing 
economic inequality within and between states belies the liberal promise of general 
prosperity and generates increasing resistance to further liberalization on the part of 
developing states (Doha Round).  
 18 
 
The current crisis, in sum, follows the logic of liberalism's constitution and historical 
development. In order to manage the tensions and fragmentary dynamics between its 
winners and losers, liberalism established a clear distinction between the domestic 
and the international political spheres - projecting the dark side of its policies into the 
international sphere as a precondition for realizing its promises in the domestic 
sphere. Ironically, however, the successful spread of liberal principles anbd practices 
into the international sphere undermines this divide and with it the basis of liberalism 
itself. 
 
Conclusion: the prospects of democratic internationalism 
Advocates of liberal internationalism are highly perceptive when they note that the 
current crisis is rooted in the overwhelming success - rather than failure - of liberal 
internationalism. It was indeed the 'triumph' of liberalism over its Cold War 
competitor and the resultant liberal world order that engendered this crisis. But they 
underestimate the nature and significance of this success and thus also misjudge the 
prospects of a reformed democratic internationalism.  
 
The success of post-WW II American foreign policy, they argue, fed American 
hubris, arrogance, and exceptionalism which in turn found expression in insensitive 
and high-handed policies that ultimately undermined the community of liberal states 
and contributed to a shift of power relations away from the US and its European 
allies.81 It also lay behind the aggressive spread of 'fundamentalist capitalism' which 
created the very inequalities that now feed resistance against globalization, free trade, 
banks, and common markets.82 The logic of this analysis, however, suggests that the 
current crisis can be resolved with no more than a dose of humble pie. The US has to 
recognize and accept that there exist different models of democracy, that liberalism 
can only thrive if it practices a social democratic and thus more equitable form of 
capitalism, that it must respect the sovereignty of other states, and that it has to abide 
by international law and respect human rights at home if it wants to spread them 
abroad. Today, the prospects of this democratic internationalism, proponents argue, 
are 'unprecedented' because liberalism does not face a serious external threat and is 
therefore free to pursue the necessary 'internal reforms'. 83  
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This analysis overlooks that the success of liberal internationalism depends on this 
very distinction between inside and outside, domestic and international, liberal and 
nonliberal spheres. The establishment of liberalism requires, and historically 
systematically entailed, both appropriation and expropriation, political emancipation 
and political oppression. Indeed, as Ikenberry notes, the US rejected treaties, violated 
rules, ignored allies and used military force 'in every historical period' - just as it also 
respected some rules and allies. Such contradictory behavior is therefore neither the 
result of 'an occasional ad hoc policy decision' nor the expression of an 'illiberal' 
foreign policy. 84 It is, rather, an integral feature of liberalism - and hence also part of 
a reformed democratic internationalism85 - which creates tensions and conflict in 
society. The separation of the domestic and international spheres enabled liberal 
actors to manage these fragmentary tendencies: it allowed them to pursue 
expropriation abroad and redistribution at home, to practice power politics abroad and 
political emancipation at home. And these differential principles governing domestic 
and international politics were justified through nationalist, racist, developmentalist 
ideologies that asserted the superiority of domestic over foreign populations.86  
 
Yet, in a liberal world order, populations in core liberal states no longer experience 
the import of economic benefits from abroad but their export in the form of 
investment and jobs. And instead of the export of political conflicts, these now find 
their way into the domestic sphere, in the form of refugees, migrants or terrorists. And 
traditional identities based on the superiority of particular nations, races, genders, 
religions or sexualities are delegitimated by the globalization of human rights.  
 
The erosion of the domestic/international divide thus destroys the liberal consensus 
within society. Socioeconomic cleavages are increasing; 87 extreme parties on the 
right and the left are getting stronger; 88 nationalism, racism and sexism are becoming 
respectable again; and the very idea of reason, truth, science, expertise upon which 
liberal claims were traditionally based is under attack.89  
 
Most importantly, however, today's populist movements explicitly identify liberal 
internationalism as the cause of the problem. They despise multilateralism, refuse to 
cooperate with international organizations, and (try to) exit the EU; they drop free 
trade agreements and pursue protectionist policies; they prioritize domestic over 
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international law, citizenship over human rights; they pursue travel bans and try to 
stop migration; they put 'America first' or 'take back control'.90 All these policies serve 
but one goal: to reestablish a clear distinction between the domestic and the 
international sphere by building (ideological, legal or real) walls between nations. 
They aim to return to a time when this distinction ensured political consensus, 
economic prosperity, and a privileged identity through the exercise of power politics 
in the international sphere. 
 
If this analysis is correct, then the survival of liberalism - and by extension the 
prospects of a democratic internationalism - depends on the emergence or 
construction of a serious external and/or internal threat. The core characteristics that 
we associate with liberalism today - democracy, prosperity, and equality before the 
law - are historically the result of 'significant social conflict and possible threat of 
revolution' that forced liberal elites to give up a wider share of political rights and 
economic benefits.91 In the absence of such political pressure, the spread of 
democracy does not provide the basis for cooperation and burden sharing, as 
democratic internationalists argue.92 On the contrary, democratic states have to 
provide economic benefits to the majority of their populations.93 Democratization thus 
entails increasing pressure to secure a larger share of material benefits on the world 
market which leads to competition rather than cooperation between democratic 
states.94 Similarly, in the absence of political pressure, liberal elites have no reason to 
engage in social democratic forms of redistribution. Even the few reforms triggered 
by the recent financial crisis are already being targeted for 'rollback'.95 Moreover, 
without the political pressure to integrate a 'liberal' camp, the diversity of immigrant 
societies like the US does not provide opportunities to build bridges between states, as 
democratic internationalists argue. 96 Instead, it is widely perceived as a source of 
economic competition and cultural conflict. Finally, the lack of a serious military 
threat does not pave the way for bipartisan cooperation in the domestic sphere or 
security cooperation in the international sphere: instead, it removes the reasons for 
such cooperation. Hence, in facing contemporary terrorism - itself a product of the 
global liberal order and thus traversing the domestic/international divide - the US did 
not require the same kind of cooperation from its allies as the stand-off between the 
superpowers during the Cold War demanded.97 
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Liberalism, this study suggests, requires a nonliberal environment to thrive - and the 
successful 'liberalization' of that environment thus ironically undermines liberalism 
itself. The future of democratic internationalism then depends on the reestablishment 
of some equivalent of the domestic/international divide - which is precisely what 
current populist movements aim for. Yet, while there are clear (and frightening) 
parallels between the demise of the liberal world order in the first part of the 20th 
century and its crisis today, there are also considerable differences. Both the Trump 
administration and the Brexiteers quickly found that 'taking back control', building 
walls and stopping migration, was easier said than done in a highly integrated world 
order. Their less than inspiring example also seems to have undermined support for 
similar populist movements in other states. And the generational division in the Brexit 
referendum suggests that younger people feel much less threatened by cultural 
pluralism - or maybe simply lack the experience of a thriving, relatively equitable and 
prosperous liberal polity to return to. As Moshik Temkin has recently observed, 
although history displays instructive parallels, it rarely repeats itself. We can thus not 
predict the future of democratic internationalism on the basis of historical precedent. 
'But we can provide a critical, uncomfortable account of how we arrived at our 
seemingly incomprehensible current moment'.98 And this is what a critical theory of 
liberal internationalism enables us to do. 
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